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ABSTRACT
Elaborating a popular assumption about the effects of immigration
policies on the integration of migrants, we argue in this article that
more restrictive immigration policies lead to the selection of
immigrants with greater integration potential, and that this
selection should foster migrant integration. To test this argument,
we combine country-level data from the Immigration Policies in
Comparison (IMPIC) database with individual-level data on
economic, political and social integration from multiple rounds of
the European Social Survey (ESS) across 22 European countries.
We show that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not
increase the likelihood of more educated migrants to be admitted,
but they do make it more likely for migrants from European OECD
countries to be admitted, while making it less likely for migrants
outside the OECD. Second, we find that immigration policies
affect some forms of economic, political and social integration
outcomes, but mostly for immigrants from non-OECD countries.
We conclude that immigration policies do affect integration
outcomes but that these effects are small and limited to specific
integration outcomes and migrants from specific regions. Our
study, therefore, relativises the underlying popular assumption
that immigration restrictions foster migrant integration, bearing
important implications for the currently salient debates on
immigration policy-making.
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Introduction
In the context of increasing migration inflows, debates over how to best integrate immi-
grants have become very important in Western societies over the last decades. These
debates not only revolve around the effectiveness of integration policies but also around
the role of immigration policies. It is often assumed that a more targeted selection of
migrants according to criteria that are aimed at helping them integrate (which we shall
call integration potential) foster migrant integration. This was for example an important
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issue in the 2017 German elections when both left and right liberal parties alluded to the
idea: The Free Democratic Party (FDP) wanted to reform the Blue Card that allows high-
skilled migrants to migrate to Germany in order to reach better social and economic inte-
gration outcomes (FDP 2017, 69). In addition, they proposed to introduce a point system
that considers age, language capacities and skills, as in their view integration courses are
not enough to build modern immigration societies. The Social Democratic Party (SPD)
also promoted a point system to improve what they explicitly called the ‘migrants’ capacity
to integrate’ (SPD 2017, 77). However, despite the practical relevance of this idea, systema-
tic research on this topic is rare, and we do not know whether restrictive immigration pol-
icies indeed lead to better integration outcomes.
Migrants are fully integrated if they participate on an equal basis with natives in major
institutions of the host country such as the labour market or the political system and if
they feel recognised as a part of the national community (Alba and Foner 2015, 5).
Accordingly, we focus in this paper on migrants’ employment and socio-economic occu-
pational status, their political trust and participation as well as their social trust and per-
ceived discrimination. To study the degree of migrant integration in these different
domains most studies so far have focused on the policy effects of integration and citizen-
ship policies (e.g. Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; Koopmans 2010; Helbling et al. 2016;
Vernby 2013; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2017). These policies are aimed
at providing immigrants with rights and duties that constitute necessary resources or
incentives to participate economically, politically and socially in the host society.
There are only very few studies that have looked at the effects of immigration policies,
which regulate who is admitted and allowed to remain in a country. Waldinger (2003, 263)
and Massey et al. (1998) pointed to this selection effect already two decades ago. More
recently, several studies have focused on very specific aspects only, be it single policy
changes and/or effects in a small number of countries (Rinne 2012, 12–13). Söhn
(2013) is the only one who looks at the effects of both immigration and integration policies
and shows that for Aussiedler in Germany language skills and classes had positive impacts
on structural integration. Chiswick and Miller (2004) found that the way visa categories
were organised in the 1990s had an effect on immigrants’ language skills in Australia.
Tani (2019) showed that the introduction of more restrictive measures for labour migrants
in Australia in the late 1990s influenced the human capital of the affected group. There
was, however, no detectable impact on indicators measuring immigrants’ skill utilisation.
The same policy change was exploited by Cobb-Clark (2003), who found that the more
restrictive selection criteria lead to better labour market integration. Constant and Zim-
mermann (2005) as well as Cangiano (2014) investigate the role entry channels play in
Germany and Denmark in the early 2003, respectively for several European countries in
2008. They show that, compared to labour migrants, humanitarian and family migrants
have lower salaries and are less likely to be employed.
Against the backgroundof the limitations of existing studies,we attempt for thefirst time to
test in a systematic and comprehensive way the role immigration policies play in integrating
migrants economically, politically and socially. We argue that if policies are more restrictive,
more criteria need to be fulfilled to enter a country, which in turn increases the selectivity of
the regulations. In other words, by increasing the integration potential of admitted migrants,
restrictive immigration regulations should lead to better integration outcomes.We also argue
that selection effects are more likely to emerge for migrant groups with a relatively low
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integration potential or relatively high social distance, by which we mean immigrants from
poorer countries whose citizens have, on average, a lower level of education.
To test our arguments, we combine rounds 1–8 from the European Social Survey (ESS)
to measure economic, political and social dimensions of integration outcomes with data
from the newly built Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset to measure
immigration policy restrictiveness (Helbling et al. 2017) across a large number of Euro-
pean countries. We mostly focus on how migrants are selected based on their education
and regions of origin to measure their skills and social distance. We show that, first,
more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the likelihood of more educated
migrants to be admitted, but the likelihood of migrants from European OECD countries
compared to migrants from other regions. Second, we find that immigration policies affect
some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but mostly for immi-
grants from non-OECD countries.
Immigration policies and integration potential
Migration selection processes can serve various purposes. In some cases, the very aim of
these policies was to keep migrants in the country for only a short period of time and to
prevent them from integrating as it was the case with many guest worker programmes
(Ellermann 2013). After the oil crisis of the 1970s more and more policies have been
implemented whose aim it is to attract high-skilled migrants while deterring low-skilled
migrants (Cerna 2014; Doomernik et al. 2009, ix). Selection based on skill does not
only constitute a means to meet the demand for high-skilled professionals (Constant
and Zimmermann 2005). High-skilled immigrants are also increasingly viewed to be
easier to integrate economically, socially and politically, as they purportedly possess the
necessary language skills and level of education (Doomernik et al. 2009, 10).
Cultural characteristics constitute another group of important selection criteria. Since
the 2000s several Western European states have introduced pre-arrival integration tests
(mostly focused on language capacities and country knowledge) whose aim it is to
select migrants that are easier to integrate (Goodman 2012, 2014). Such strategies
already existed in earlier times in the Americas and were mostly based on group-level
racial categories (FitzGerald et al. 2017). Ethnocentric attitudes can still be found nowa-
days behind the individual based selection criteria as exceptions are made based on the
immigrants’ nationalities and as the introduction of these tests decreased the number of
migrants mostly from Muslim countries (FitzGerald et al. 2017).
In a nutshell, among other criteria current immigration regulations include numerous
conditions regarding economic and cultural requirements (Bjerre et al. 2016, 9). Increas-
ing restrictiveness regarding these criteria aims at selectively restricting the group of
migrants to those who are financially more independent, better qualified and culturally
closer to the host society. As Cangiano (2014, 423) and Bonjour (2014) have already
noted, the establishment of such conditions constitute selection mechanisms that might
lead to better migrant integration as migrants have better ‘starting positions’ as Söhn
(2013, 320) puts it. We refer to this idea as integration potential. Various studies have
shown that integration gaps can indeed be explained by the integration potential in
terms of migrants’ skill levels and social distance to the host society (Granato and
Kalter 2001; Heath and Martin 2013; Ebner and Helbling 2016).
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We argue that this relationship holds for economic, social and political integration to the
same extent as high education can be seen as a resource that helps immigrants access the job
market, social networks and become politically active. Such migrants are better qualified for
(high-skilled) jobs (economic integration) and share similar values and thus have fewer
difficulties to connect to the host society and to be accepted by them (social integration).
We also know from existing research that higher education leads to more political partici-
pation (Aleksynska 2008; Maxwell 2010) and economic and social capital to increased pol-
itical trust and political participation (Jacobs and Tillie 2004). It can thus be argued that
more restrictive immigration policies lead to better economic, political and social integration
outcomes as migrants are selected based on their integration potential (H1).
This selection process can occur right at the border when it is decided who can enter the
country and who cannot. It can also happen through self-selection when potential migrants
with a low integration potential are deterred by restrictive measures and decide, for example,
against applying for a visa or prefer to move to a more liberal country (Docquier, Peri, and
Ruyssen 2014). Such decisions might be affected by initiatives through which states try to
attract high-skilled migrants and thereby convey clear signals about the kind of migrants
they want (Shachar 2006). Migrants might also improve their integration potential
through step-wise migration (Paul 2011). They first move to countries that are easier to
access to gain certain skills that allow them to migrate to more restrictive countries.
Diverging selection effects across country groups
It has been heavily debated for some time whether immigration policies have any effects
on migration flows. If there are no policy effects on flows, there is no selection of migrants
with preferred characteristics. Castles (2004) and Sassen (1996, 63–105) argue that state
immigration policies have failed and sovereignty in this field eroded, among others
because international human rights treaties and principles of freedom of circulation
have prevented nation-states from closing national boundaries. Meanwhile, Messina
(2007, 244) concludes that ‘the declining sovereignty thesis is largely exaggerated and
unsubstantiated by the facts’. Nowadays, nation-states have better means to control
their borders (Freeman 1994) and often externalise controls to non-state actors or
control migration through venue shopping (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Zolberg 2003).
Several studies have already shown that there are indeed policy effects on immigration
flows (Hatton 2004; Ortega and Peri 2013; Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014; Helbling
and Leblang 2018). It can be assumed that these effects depend on the demand-side of
migration that has not been considered by studies investigating the immigration policy
effects. This has also consequences for immigration policy effects on migrant integration
outcomes. If it is people with a high integration potential fromOECD countries that primar-
ily want to move, policy effects disappear as migrants fulfil the eligibility criteria in both gen-
erous and restrictive immigration countries. Selection and consequently integration effects
can thus only be observed if there is variation in the demand for migration among both
groups of migrants with high and low integration potential. This variation depends to a
large extent on the sending countries’ characteristics. As Söhn (2013, 304) puts it:
While ‘poorly’ educated immigrants from more developed countries usually have at least
basic literacy skills, immigrants coming from lower social strata of less developed states
are less likely to be literate and will have a hard time finding qualified jobs.
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As Migali and Scipioni (2018) show, the socio-economic status of persons who intend
to migrate varies considerably across low- and high-income countries. The share of poten-
tial migrants in low-income countries that have a tertiary degree is much lower than in
high-income countries. Given the fact that there is a high correlation between potential
and actual migrants (Tjaden, Auer, and Laczko 2019), it can be assumed that immigrants
from such countries have on average a much lower integration potential than immigrants
from high-income countries that consist mostly of immigrants with a high integration
potential. It can therefore be argued that the selection mechanisms only have an effect
for groups that consists of migrants from low-income countries with an average integration
potential that is relatively low (H2).
Reverse causality arguments
The argument that immigration regulations affect integration outcomes is based on the
assumptions that regulations affect migrant integration and not vice versa. It is plausible
to assume that a country’s immigration regulations become more restrictive because
migrant integration is poor. However, even if this is the case it is not clear whether new
regulations lead to better integration outcomes. It is still of interest whether policies are
effective, irrespective of the reasons of their introduction. There would only be endogene-
ity if restrictive policies are introduced because integration outcomes are very good. But
there is little reason to expect such a relationship.
More importantly, reverse causality could only become a problem if migrant inte-
gration outcomes were aggregated to the national level and regressed on immigration pol-
icies at that same level. In this paper, we hold instead that to assess the potential
association between immigration policies and migrant integration outcomes, individual
migrants must be matched with the immigration policy they were exposed to. Hence,
in our models immigration policies are temporally prior to migrant integration outcomes
and, therefore, these outcomes cannot determine the specific immigration policies the
individual migrants were exposed to.
Integration outcomes might also be affected by return migration if migrants with high
and low integration potentials have different likelihoods to return. However, it is far from
clear whether such a bias exists. It can be assumed that people with a low integration
potential have a higher likelihood to return exactly because they did not integrate, did
not find a job and/or did not feel at home (Dustmann 1996; Dustmann and Weiss
2007). However, these people also have a higher likelihood to come from less attractive
countries, which makes a return less probable and naturalisation more probable (Dronkers
and Maarten 2012). Those with a higher integration potential might also have a higher
likelihood to return (or move to a third country) as they are generally more mobile regard-
ing financial resources and social capital.
Data and methods
Immigration policies
To measure the restrictiveness of immigration policies we draw on the Immigration Pol-
icies in Comparison (IMPIC) database (Helbling et al. 2017). The IMPIC measures policy
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outputs (i.e. actual laws and regulations rather than their implementation or their related
policy outcomes) for 33 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) from 1980 until 2010. It covers regulations regarding labour immi-
gration, family reunification, refugee and asylum policies, and policies targeting co-
ethnics.1
For each of these fields the comprehensive IMPIC index captures the restrictiveness of
entry conditions and eligibility criteria that define how difficult it is to establish legal resi-
dence in a country. Moreover, the rights and the security of status associated with a
respective entry permit are included that stipulate for how long immigrants can stay on
the territory and to what extent they are granted certain rights such as access to the
labour market.2 In addition, the IMPIC measures immigration control mechanisms that
cross-cut these policy fields, indicating how strictly the regulations are enforced, and
how undocumented migrants are treated. Using categorical principal component analysis
(CATPCA), it has been shown that the regulations in the three policy fields of labour
migration, family reunification and asylum can be reduced to a single and consistent
empirical dimension (Schmid and Helbling 2016). The special and usually marginal cat-
egory of co-ethnics as well as the variables capturing control mechanisms form separate
dimensions.
Building on the latter result, in the following analyses we will thus use one comprehen-
sive index that combines the regulations in the three policy fields of labour migration,
family reunification and asylum (see also Helbling and Leblang 2018). These are the
fields that nowadays constitute the main legal channels of migration into advanced indus-
trialised societies (Messina 2007, 20–46; Schain 2008, ch.1). Regulations targeting co-
ethnic immigrants are excluded, because they exist only in a few countries and, as
already mentioned, concern a very special category of immigrants. Finally, control mech-
anisms do not concern selection and therefore are irrelevant for testing the argument.
In Table A1 in the Appendix we list all regulations that we used to build an additive
index that measures the restrictiveness of immigration regulations and that varies
between 0 (liberal) and 1 (restrictive) (for codebook and technical details see Bjerre
et al. 2016). Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates the distribution of the restrictiveness
of immigration policies comprehensively for all three policy fields in our twenty-two
host countries for the years 1980–2010. It shows that immigration policy restrictiveness
in these fields varies over time within countries, providing within-variation for our statisti-
cal analyses, which include fixed-effects for the receiving countries. Furthermore, it reveals
that immigration policies in most countries became more liberal over time (see also
Schmid and Helbling 2016).
Migrant integration
To measure immigrant integration outcomes on the individual level for a sufficient
number of immigrants, we pool eight waves (2002–2016) of the European Social Survey
(ESS). ESS is the only survey that allows us to investigate migrant integration across a
large number of countries and years. For the purposes of our study we only include
first-generation immigrants, which are defined as persons who have been born outside
the country of destination, and if at least one of their parents also fulfils this criterion.3
From this group, we exclude all those who have entered as EU citizens under the EU
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free movement regime, as national immigration restrictions do not apply to this group. EU
citizens that entered before the free movement regime was in place are included. More-
over, we only include persons who have been resident for 20 years or less in the host
country as we assume that the selection effects become negligible after such a long time.
As IMPIC covers the years 1980–2010, we only include persons that entered the host
country in this period. Furthermore, we do not know whether persons below the age of
eighteen came with their parents and therefore were not themselves selected by immigra-
tion policies. Therefore, we only included people that were at least 18 years of age when
they entered the country.
Using the ESS for research on immigrant integration may have certain drawbacks. The
data is produced in lengthy face-to-face interviews which are conducted only in (one of)
the host country’s language(s). This has two potential implications. First, questioning
immigrants about their integration in such a personal setting may aggravate problems
of social desirability, making the respondents likely to report more ‘positive’ outcomes.
Second, the fact that language proficiency of (one of) the host country’s language(s) is
required for participation in the ESS may create not only a general under-representation
of immigrants in the sample but could also bias the sample towards immigrants who are
more integrated. Nevertheless, while the first problem constitutes a generally unresolved
issue in survey research, the second problem is partly mitigated by the inclusion of
several individual-level control variables (in some of our models) that are also associated
with varying aspects and degrees of integration.
Following Alba and Foner (2015, 5) we define integration as a process that allows
migrants to participate in the important domains of their host societies and to feel
accepted as part of that society. These domains include the educational and political
system as well as the labour and housing markets. The questions included in the ESS
do not allow us to measure all but some of the most important forms of integration,
namely the integration into the labour market and the political system as well as feelings
of acceptance. While there certainly exist further items to measure relevant forms of inte-
gration the questions included in the different ESS waves allow us to analyse some impor-
tant aspects of economic, political and social integration (see Table A2 in Appendix for
question wordings).4 For economic integration, our measures cover two aspects of immi-
grants’ labour market outcomes: employment and socio-economic occupational status. The
former is a dummy measuring whether in the last five years the respondent has not had a
longer period of unemployment that is three months or more and has also been employed
by Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) to study economic integration (see also van Tuber-
gen, Maas, and Flap 2004). For socio-economic occupational status we use the ISEI scale
(International Socio-Economic Index; Ganzeboom, de Graaf, and Treiman 1992). The
ISEI is derived from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)
combined with information on education and income and constitutes a measure of the
status of specific occupations. In order to make sure to only include individuals that are
economically active, we limited the economic outcome indicators to respondents that
are not older than 65.
To capture immigrant political integration, we use four indicators that have been
employed by Helbling et al. (2016) to measure political integration. We measure, first of
all, political interest and political trust. While the former is a single four-point variable,
the latter is a composite of trust in political parties, in the national parliament, and in
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politicians, which are all 11-point scale items. Secondly, we measure conventional and
unconventional political participation. The first is a four-item additive scale of being
member of a political party, working in a party or action group, contacting a politician or
government official, or working in another organisation or association.5 The second is a
four-item additive scale of having worn campaign badges and stickers, having signed a
petition, having taken part in a lawful public demonstration, or having boycotted a
product. We acknowledge that it might not be fully clear whether unconventional forms
of participation, particularly demonstration activities, can be seen unambiguously as
instances of political integration. Yet we are interested in this aspect of political participation,
because especially if immigrants may feel unwelcome in the receiving country and politically
inefficient, they may fall back on such unconventional forms of political participation.
Finally, to measure social integration we use two indicators: social trust and not having
perceived discrimination. We define social trust as generalised trust, which denotes trust in
people that are personally unknown (Stolle 2002). Our measure combines three 11-point
variables available in the ESS and which have been shown to form a reliable scale in pre-
vious research (cf. Rosenberg 1956) and that have been used in the study by Dinesen and
Hooghe (2010) to measure migrants’ integration. Our measure for not having perceived
discrimination is a dummy variable that measures whether respondents have not per-
ceived discrimination in at least one of three domains: colour or race, nationality and
ethnic group membership. We consider this aspect of integration to be an indicator for
social integration in contrast to, for instance, labour market integration, because the
absence of discrimination perceptions as measured with this variable is not restricted to
a specific social situation or organisational domain (such as the labour and housing
markets or the education system).
To facilitate visualisation and comparison, we standardise all dependent variables from
0 to 100, using empirical minima and maxima. Higher values indicate higher levels of inte-
gration. In addition, the key independent immigration policy variable is standardised with
empirical minima and maxima from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most restrictive), so that the
total effect size can be gauged directly (summary statistics are shown in Table 1).
Sample
Our sample covers a total of 22 European countries with a maximum of eight ESS rounds
that were fielded from 2002 to 2016. About 6′500 first-generation immigrants that have
resided in the country for no longer than 20 years are included (see Table 2).
Table 1. Summary statistics of dependent and key independent variables.
Indicator Mean SD Min/Max N
Political trust 47.08 22.74 0/100 6,291
Political interest 43.33 32.71 0/100 6,524
Conventional political participation 5.54 14.08 0/100 4,541
Unconventional political participation 9.81 19.64 0/100 6,479
Employment 70.68 45.53 0/100 6,292
Socio-economic occupational status 35.19 24.76 0/100 5,678
No perceived discrimination 82.69 37.83 0/100 6,553
Social trust 52.68 19.06 0/100 6,541
Education 13.14 4.52 0/38 6,449
Matched immigration policy values 0.33 0.25 0/1 6,553
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We differentiate between three broad country of origin categories that can be distin-
guished according to their social distance to European destination countries. This
allows us to differentiate between migrant groups with generally high and low integration
potential. We first use the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries of origin
and thus migrant groups with different degrees of education (Migali and Scipioni 2018),
and, accordingly, with a higher and a lower integration potential. Second, within the
OECD, we distinguish between European and non-European countries. We therefore
assume that there are three main types of migrants with varying integration potentials.
Table 3 illustrates the distribution of migrants with high, medium and low integration
potentials in European countries. It also shows the distribution of these three migrant
types overall, as well as distinguished by a dichotomisation of the immigration policy
that was in place in the year of entering the country of each individual migrant (liberal
for values above the average, restrictive for values below the average). Across both cat-
egories (all) it appears that most migrants in European countries have a low integration
potential, followed by migrants with a high integration potential and lastly those with a
medium integration potential. Moreover, we see that the distribution of these three
migrant types differs by the type of immigration policy. Countries with restrictive policies
have a higher share of migrants with a high integration potential and a lower share of
migrants with a medium and a low integration potential, which reflects our initial assump-
tions about the effects of relatively restrictive immigration policies on migrant compo-
sition. We observe the opposite if relatively liberal immigration policies were in place.
This overall unequal but systematic distribution of the types of migrants is also
reflected in Table A3 in the Appendix, which shows the distribution of the three main
migrant types across countries and ESS waves.
Table 2. Overview of the sample used in the multivariate analyses.
Country ESS rounds
Freq.
first generation immigrants
Austria 1 2 3 7 8 209
Belgium 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 387
Switzerland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 628
Czech Republic 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 54
Germany 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 658
Denmark 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 195
Estonia 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 108
Spain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 687
Finland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 166
France 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 288
Great Britain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 507
Greece 1 2 4 5 444
Hungary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 71
Ireland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 628
Italy 1 2 6 43
Luxembourg 1 2 225
Netherlands 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 297
Norway 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 238
Poland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10
Portugal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 284
Sweden 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 402
Slovakia 2 3 4 5 6 24
Total 22 countries / max. 8 rounds 6553
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Analytical strategy
To prepare the analysis we match the year of entry of individuals with country-year obser-
vations of the IMPIC indicator (see Table A4 for a description of the immigration policy
indicator). Hence, in the context of this study, the IMPIC variable is located on the indi-
vidual and not the country-level. In other words, it mainly varies across individual
migrants according to their year of immigration rather than across countries. The ESS
asks migrants how long ago they came first to live in the country (rounds 1–4) or what
year they came first to live in the country (rounds 5–8). As the ESS data does not allow
accounting for the exact entry category of immigrants, we cannot match individuals
with the specific immigration policy field that applied to them. However, the fact that
the regulations in different immigration policy fields can be reduced to the same empirical
dimension (Schmid and Helbling 2016) increases the validity of our matching approach.
As the resulting matched immigration policy variable is highly skewed, we transformed it6
to better capture the relevant variation towards the lower end of the scale (see Appendix
Figure A2).
To fully ascertain whether and how immigration policies affect migrants’ integration
outcomes, our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we explore whether more restrictive
immigration regulations increase the likelihood of a migrant to have a higher education
and come from a country that is socially closer to the host society. This is a test of the
assumption that more restrictive policies lead to better integration outcomes by
affecting the composition of the migrant population. Second, we examine whether more
restrictive immigration policies increase migrant integration outcomes and whether
skills and social distance function as selection criteria in addition to age and gender.
Third, we interact the restrictiveness of immigration policies with our country of origin
categorisation to test whether the policy effects are conditional on the social distance
between host and destination countries.
To test our arguments, we need to proceed differently from the studies that investigate
the effects of integration policies. These studies control for all relevant individual factors in
order to investigate the effect of integration policies on comparable immigrants in different
countries. In our case including many individual-level variables would distort our estimate
of how integration is affected by the composition of the migrant population. One of the
aims of immigration policies is to affect this composition of the migrant population
regarding their integration potential, which in turn affects the likelihood of successful inte-
gration. Therefore, for each dependent variable we estimate four models in which we suc-
cessively introduce individual controls that are potentially relevant for a successful
Table 3. Summary statistics of types of migrants.
Matched immigration policy values
Liberal Restrictive All
Types of migrants by origin region Social Distance Integration potential % N % N % N
European OECD migrants Low High 22 984 36 732 26 1,716
Non-European OECD migrants Medium Medium 8 355 6 119 7 474
Non-OECD migrants High Low 70 3,180 58 1,183 67 4,363
Total 100 4,519 100 2,034 100 6,553
Note: The cutoff-point for liberal/restrictive immigration policy values is defined as the arithmetic mean (=0.33) of the
matched immigration policy indicator (see Table 1; see chapter on the analytical strategy for details).
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integration in order find out how they alter the immigration policy effect. This procedure
allows us to see which immigrant characteristics are most affected by selection processes.
For instance, if the introduction of the education variable into a model leads to a reduction
or disappearance of the policy effect, this shows us that immigrants integrate better if they
have been selected based on their level of education.
Models 1 have no controls. To test the most important selection effects, as discussed in
the theory section, we proceed as follows: in Models 2 we include age and sex as basic indi-
vidual controls, in Models 3 we include age, sex and education (to measure the effect of
skills), and in Models 4 we include age, sex and country of origin categories (to
measure the effect of social distance). However, note that in all models we include receiv-
ing country and survey rounds fixed-effects as well as further time-varying country-level
factors to control for cross-national differences as well as differences over time in different
survey rounds (see below).
We use linear regressions for all dependent variables. This is because, on the one hand,
our ordinal variables sufficiently approximate linearity. On the other hand, we favour
linear probability models to analyse our binary outcomes, since they yield very similar
marginal effects as logistic regression models and are more straightforward to interpret.
The application of linear probability models for binary outcomes is increasingly viewed
as a viable strategy in sociology and economics (Mood 2010; Angrist and Pischke
2009). Given our scaling, the coefficients of these regressions indicate the increase in
the probability to observe a positive outcome for a change in the independent variable
from most liberal to most restrictive.
To control for the time-invariant host country context in these individual-level
models, we add country and survey rounds fixed-effects. We also control for various rel-
evant time-varying factors at the host country level. First, we include measures for mean
xenophobic attitudes and the percentage of the foreign-born population (see Table A5 in
Appendix for sources).7 The former captures the degree of tolerance or hostility towards
immigrants more broadly and thus reflects the reception context that might improve or
worsen integration outcomes. The size of the immigrant population is important as a
general context and might also tell us something about the restrictiveness of immigra-
tion policies. Second, we control for GDP per capita8 and the unemployment rate,
which both reflect the availability of jobs on the labour market and thus may affect
immigrants’ economic integration outcomes and contentment with the political arena
as well as the social environment. To control for general assimilation effects, we
include the native level of the respective dependent variable (see Tables A6 to A9 in
the Appendix for summary statistics of all macro- and individual-level independent
variables).9
Lastly, we introduce integration policies as a further control variable. We use the MIPEX
scores (Huddleston et al. 2015), as these constitute the most comprehensive cross-national
indicators to measure integration policies. The MIPEX captures political, social and cul-
tural rights of immigrant groups, which have been shown to affect immigrant political
integration outcomes (Helbling et al. 2016). We use the longitudinal MIPEX dataset
which was released in 2015 and which captures integration policies for each year from
2007 to 2014. MIPEX 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 were matched with the respective ESS
rounds 4–7, and MIPEX 2007 and 2014 data were used as a proxy for ESS rounds 1–3
[2002–2006] and for ESS round 8 [2016], respectively.10
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Results
We do not find that more restrictive immigration policies increase the probability of
migrants having higher skill-levels, as measured with their years of education. Although
the sign of the coefficient is positive, Table 4 shows that the association between policy
restrictiveness and education is neither statistically nor substantively significant.11
As appears in Table 5, however, the restrictiveness of immigration policies affects the
composition of migrants by countries of origin.12 The table shows the probability of a
migrant in the host country to belong to one of the three migrant groups depending on
the degree of immigration policy restrictiveness at the time of entering the country. Rela-
tive to very liberal policies, very restrictive policies increase the probability of a migrant
being of European OECD origin by 25 percentage points. At the same time, greater immi-
gration policy restrictiveness is associated with a decrease in the probability of a migrant
being of non-OECD origin by 22 percentage points. Meanwhile, immigration policies do
not have a discernable effect on the probability of a migrant being of non-European OECD
origin. Thus, more restrictive policies privilege migrants from regions with a lower social
distance, namely those of European OECD origin, and discriminate those from regions
with a higher social distance, namely those of non-OECD origin.
After having seen that restrictive immigration policies select migrants based on their
countries of origin but not based on their level of education, we now turn to the question
whether restrictive immigration policies affect migrants’ integration outcomes. Table 6
shows the means of the dependent and key independent variables by migrants’ origin
region and restrictiveness of host country immigration policies. We first see that across
all countries of origin migrants economic and political integration outcomes differ by
the type of immigration policy. Compared to countries with liberal immigration policies,
political integration is a little lower in countries with restrictive immigration policies and
economic integration is higher. The other integration outcomes are almost the same in
both groups. Regarding countries of origin, positive effects of restrictive immigration pol-
icies on economic integration outcomes are most apparent for non-OECD migrants (i.e.
low integration potential) and to a smaller extent also for non-EU OECD migrants (i.e.
medium integration potential). For all migrant groups the means on some of the political
integration outcome indicators are a little lower in countries with restrictive policies as
Table 4. Effects of immigration regulations on years of education.
Education
Matched immigration policy values 0.353
(0.575)
Constant 12.69***
(0.330)
Observations 6,400
R-squared 0.089
Country FE YES
Survey FE YES
Individual controls YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Note: Linear regressions include country and survey fixed effects as well as cluster cor-
rected standard errors at the country-level. Sex and age were included as individual-
level controls. Dependent variable scaled from 0 to 38, and independent variable
scaled from 0 to 1.
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opposed to countries with liberal policies. Moreover, for non-EU OECD migrants (i.e.
medium integration potential), social integration outcomes are a little higher in countries
with restrictive immigration policies.
These results provide some first evidence for our hypotheses. Restrictive immigration
policies lead to better economic integration outcomes (H1), but this effect seems to be
exclusive for migrants from non-EU OECD and non-OECD countries (H2). However,
political integration outcomes for these two groups are lower in countries with restrictive
immigration policies.
Figure 1 shows the effects of immigration policies on various outcome variables, each of
which is analysed by four model specifications, as explained above (see Tables A12a to
A12d in Appendix for full regression outputs). We observe only one statistically significant
regression coefficient: A shift from very liberal to very restrictive immigration policies is
associated with a higher probability of not having been unemployed in the past five
years. The effect size is between 10 and 13 percentage points, depending on the model spe-
cification. While accounting for skills does not change anything, controlling for region of
origin reduces the estimated effect size to some extent. This suggests that social distance
rather than the skill-level acts as a selection criterion mediating the effect of immigration
policy restrictiveness on unemployment. Otherwise, we observe no statistically and sub-
stantively significant effects of more restrictive immigration policies on integration out-
comes. We therefore reject our first hypothesis.
In the last step of our analyses we like to know whether the policy effects vary across
migrants from different regions. As explained in the theory section, we expect larger
Table 5. Predicted marginal effects of immigration policies on types of migrants.
European OECD Non-European OECD Non-OECD
Matched immigration policy values 0.247** −0.0305 −0.217**
(0.0761) (0.0502) (0.0723)
Observations 6,490 6,490 6,490
Country FE YES YES YES
Survey FE YES YES YES
Individual controls YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Note: Predicted marginal effects estimated using multinomial logistic regression. Models include country and survey fixed-
effects as well as cluster corrected standard errors at the country level. Sex and age were included as individual-level
controls; independent variable scaled from 0 to 1.
Table 6. Means of integration outcomes by origin region and host country immigration policy.
Liberal matched
immigration policy values
Restrictive matched
immigration policy values
Indicator All EU-OECD Non-EU OECD Non-OECD All EU-OECD Non-EU OECD Non-OECD
Socio-econ. status 34 41 42 31 38 37 45 37
Employment 68 78 75 65 76 79 81 73
Political trust 49 49 49 49 43 41 42 45
Political interest 44 48 50 41 41 42 51 40
Conv. pol. part. 6 6 7 5 5 6 6 5
Uncon. pol. part. 10 13 14 9 9 12 12 7
No perc. discr. 82 91 82 79 84 91 87 80
Social trust 53 55 54 52 52 52 59 52
Note: The cutoff-point for restrictive/liberal immigration policies is again defined as the arithmetic mean (=0.33) of the
matched immigration policy indicator.
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selection effects for migrants from non-OECD countries as compared to migrants from
OECD countries, and especially compared to those from European OECD countries. In
Figure 2 we display graphs with marginal effects for statistically significant interaction
terms between the origin region variable and the immigration policy predictor (see
Table A13 in the Appendix for full regression outputs).
First, non-OECD migrants are statistically different from European OECD migrants
regarding the association between immigration policy restrictiveness and socio-economic
occupational status. For migrants from outside the OECD, the socio-economic occu-
pational status increases by almost 7 points when we they entered a country under a
Figure 1. Effects of restrictive immigration policies on migrant integration outcomes.
Note: Entries are coefficients from linear regression models; dependent variables standardised from 0 to 100; independent
variables standardised from 0 to 1; solid bars represent 95 per cent confidence intervals; models include country and survey
fixed-effects and cluster-corrected standard errors at the country-level; DV = dependent variable.
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very restrictive instead of a very liberal immigration regime, though the net effect is still
below 10 points on the 100 points scale.
Second, non-OECD migrants differ to a statistically significant extent from European
OECD migrants regarding the association between restrictive immigration policies and
employment. For migrants coming from outside the OECD, the chances of being
employed versus having recently been unemployed increase by almost 14 percentage
points when they entered a country under a very restrictive instead of a very liberal immi-
gration regime. Non-European OECD migrants are not statistically different from non-
OECD migrants but substantively, their employment chances increase with greater immi-
gration policy restrictiveness, though in a slightly less pronounced way and starting from a
higher absolute level of employment. Hence, the general immigration policy effect we
observe for employment outcomes is mainly driven by specific selection effects for non-
OECD migrants.
Third, we also observe diverging effects on immigration policies on political trust
among non-OECD and OECDmigrants. In this case, however, it appears that for migrants
from the OECD area, greater selection reduces political trust while it remains stable across
different immigration regimes for non-OECD migrants. The net effect is also below 5
points on the 100 points scale. We speculate that non-OECD migrants with a higher
social distance may experience the political system more positively when they have
been granted access under a restrictive immigration regime, perceiving the possibility
for settlement as a reward. For OECDmigrants with a lower social distance, highly restric-
tive immigration policies may symbolise a more hostile political reception context.
Figure 2. How the immigration policy effect differs across types of migrants.
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Fourth, we see diverging policy effects on social trust. While for non-OECD migrants
the association is non-existent, for non-European OECD migrants it is positive and
slightly below 10 points on a 100 points scale. It might be that selection is perceived as
a higher reward and therefore leads to more social trust. As social trust can also be inter-
preted as a very general integration indicator, this result may point to the specific effective-
ness of selection when it comes to migrants that are different yet proximate enough in
social terms. Overall, we see that our second hypothesis can be confirmed for all three
forms of integration investigated in this paper (but not all measurements of these forms
of integration).
Robustness checks
We conducted several supplemental analyses to assess the robustness of our results.
The main goal of these analyses is to ascertain whether the general effect of the restric-
tiveness of immigration policies on employment outcomes is robust across different
dimensions of immigration policies. These disaggregated analyses show that this
main finding remains the same when we examine the effects of individual policy
fields as well as of so-called internal and external policy dimensions separately (see
Tables A14a to A18d in Appendix for further details and regression outputs). The
positive policy effect of our composite immigration policy indicator on employment
status is the result of restrictive internal immigration policies (that is laws regulating
status security and permit rights13) rather than external immigration policies (that is
laws regulating eligibility and further conditions), though the latter policies are also
substantively significant in terms of effect size. The disaggregated results also show
that more restrictive asylum policies are positively associated with migrants’ socio-
economic status, their political interest, perceived discrimination, and social trust. Fur-
thermore, we also find a small positive effect of restrictive family reunification policies
on employment when either sex and age or sex, age and education is controlled for.
These results therefore do not fully support our results for employment outcomes
across different model specifications. Instead, they suggest that only by considering
all relevant immigration policies we can speak of a robust association of restriction
with better employment chances. These analyses also show that further research
that can reliably match separate immigration policy areas with distinct types of
migrants is needed.
Second, we run additional analyses for all dependent variables in which we exclude
migrants with a short stay of five years or less. We do this for two reasons. The first
reason relates to our employment indicator. Our employment integration indicator
measures unemployment that happened within the last five years. To avoid that the
results are affected by migrants who were still living in their home country in that five-
year period and who have possibly been unemployed during that time, we conducted
additional analyses in which we excluded migrants who stayed in the host country for
less than five years. The results of our additional analyses show that the effect of the
matched immigration policy values on employment status is stronger if we exclude
these migrants from our analyses, thus corroborating our initial results. For all other
dependent variables excluding this group of migrants makes no difference (see Tables
A19a–d in Appendix for regression outputs).
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Third, in our regression analyses we applied linear probability models for our binary
outcome indicators.More detailed analyses have shown that the results donot change substan-
tially if we run logistic regression models for the binary outcome variables employment and
perception of discrimination (see Tables A20 and A21 in Appendix for regression outputs).
Fourth, as we are not able to differentiate between years of education accumulated in
the origin and host country, we ran additional regressions using a years of education vari-
able that we adjusted for the years of education that immigrants have supposedly accumu-
lated in the host country. First, we use our estimation of the age upon entry to identify
those that can be assumed to have accumulated years of education in the receiving
country. Combining this information with the residence duration, we then estimated
the years of education before and after entry. The results do not deviate substantially
from the results in Table 4 (they are available upon request).
Conclusion
In this study we have shown that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not
increase the number of more educated migrants but the number of migrants from Euro-
pean OECD countries compared to migrants from other countries. This finding adds
important evidence to the literature that investigates how immigrants are selected on cul-
tural characteristics (FitzGerald et al. 2017). Second, we find that immigration policies
affect some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but only for
immigrants from mostly non-OECD countries. The effect on employment is limited to
non-OECD and non-European OECD migrants. While for non-OECD migrants political
trust remains stable, for OECD migrants it decreases when immigration policies are more
restrictive. And while for non-European OECDmigrants social trust increases with greater
selection, for non-OECD migrants and European OECD migrants the restrictiveness of
immigration policies only has a very small effect. It thus appears that the demand-side
of immigration plays an important role in understanding selection effects. If mostly
migrants with a relatively high integration potential intend to migrate, which is mainly
the case for European OECD migrants, selection mechanisms become irrelevant.
We conclude that immigration policies do affect integration outcomes (Hypothesis 1)
but that these effects are limited to economic integration or migrants that come from
countries outside the OECD (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, when viewed from the angle of
the broader literature, both integration and immigration policies appear to play a minor
role when it comes to migrant integration. It can be noted however that our analyses
confirm for a larger sample of countries earlier economic studies that focused on individ-
ual countries and showed that immigration policies affect migrants’ economic integration
(Cobb-Clark 2003; Constant and Zimmermann 2005; Cangiano 2014). This stands in con-
trast to the literature on integration policies that did not detect any policy effects on the
economic integration of migrants (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010). These findings
put in perspective the widespread assumption that greater immigration policy restrictive-
ness has a general and substantial positive effect on various migrant integration outcomes.
While this study helps us better understand how immigration regulations affect
migrant integration it also faces certain limitations. It needs to be kept in mind that
migrant participants in the ESS surveys are most likely relatively well integrated. Also, a
common limitation of studies that investigate policy effects concerns the fact that the
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role of relatively highly aggregated measures are studied. Finding overall null effects does
therefore not mean that individual regulations do not have very concrete effects.
Besides tackling these measurement problems future research also needs to investigate
why exactly policies are relatively ineffective when it comes to migrant integration. As
recent research has shown, immigration regulations do affect migrant inflows (Hatton
2004; Ortega and Peri 2013; Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014; Helbling and Leblang
2018). As we have shown in this study, however, this does not necessarily imply that the
selected immigrants integrate better. This might be due to the fact that restrictive policies
can lead to unintended effects when the number of irregular migration increases and
return migration is discouraged (Brekke, Roed, and Schone 2016; Czaika and de Haas
2016; Czaika and Hobolth 2016). We also need to take a closer look at how difficult it is
even for high-skilled migrants to integrate when it comes to the transfer of skills from
one country to another, when they lack the required social and cultural capital, or when
they encounter discrimination (see Steinmann 2019). This would also be a reason to inves-
tigate the relationship between immigration and integration policies as well as their inter-
action in producing integration outcomes. Hence, while we hope our analysis has broken
important ground in the study of the potential effects of immigration policies on migrant
integration, much remains to be done. What seems certain is that the currently salient
and heated debates on immigration policy-making need more systematic scientific evidence.
Notes
1. The last group concerns people who are entitled to easier access to immigration because of
cultural or historical affiliations to the nation-state. This might be because these groups share
the same language or religion as the country of destination; because their ancestors emigrated
from this country, or because of former colonial ties.
2. Although there is some overlap, these regulations are different from integration policies as
measured, for example, by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Huddleston et al. 2015).
Integration policies are not tied to specific entry permits but cover more general political,
social and cultural rights of immigrant groups (Helbling et al. 2017, 84–85).
3. Following Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010, 352) we exclude foreign-born persons whose
parents are both native. It can be assumed that these persons are children of expats rather
than ordinary immigrants who themselves consciously decide to immigrate.
4. In other words, we do not claim that our operationalisation covers all aspects of economic,
political and social integration. However, we are convinced that the items provided by the
European Social Survey include very relevant aspects of these three forms of integration
that have been employed by other studies.
5. As the variable party membership is not available in ESS rounds 6–8, we can only analyse
conventional participation for the remaining rounds.
6. We reversed the scaling of the variable, then squared it, and then reversed it again.
7. Missing data for some country-years for the percentage of the foreign-born population have
been replaced with data from succeeding and previous years.
8. GDP per capita was divided by 1,000 to ease interpretation.
9. For the analysis of unemployment we only use the unemployment rate and not the aggregate
native level so as to capture the more objective reality that is not dependent on the survey.
10. MIPEX is standardised with empirical minima and maxima from 0 (most exclusive) to 1
(most inclusive) to allow comparison of effect sizes with our immigration policy indicator.
11. See Table A10 for full regression outputs.
12. See Table A11 for full regression outputs.
13. This is different from integration policies, which measure general rights.
2620 M. HELBLING ET AL.
Acknowledgements
During the process leading to this article we had the chance to present our project at different
occasions and we received a lot of helpful feedback and suggestions. We especially want to thank
(in alphabetical order) Ruud Koopmans, Philipp Lutz, Rashaan Maxwell, Maarten Vink, and
Matthew Wright. Furthermore, we are grateful for the suggestions of the JEMS referees.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [grant number HE6182/1-1].
ORCID
Stephan Simon http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2917-1714
Samuel D. Schmid http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1105-3071
References
Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. 2015. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of
Integration in North America and Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Aleksynska, Mariya. 2008. “Quantitative Assessment of Immigrants’ Civic Activities: Exploring the
European Social Survey.” In Highly Active Immigrants – A Resource for European Civil Societies,
edited by Dita Vogel, pp. 59–76. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s
Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bjerre, Liv, Marc Helbling, Friederike Römer, and Malisa Zobel. 2015. “Conceptualizing and
Measuring Immigration Policies.” A Comparative Perspective. International Migration Review
49 (3): 555–600.
Bjerre, Liv, Marc Helbling, Friederike Römer, and Malisa Zobel. 2016. “The Immigration Policies in
Comparison (IMPIC) Dataset: Technical Report.” WZB Discussion Paper SP VI 2016-201.
Brekke, Jan-Paul. Marianne Roed Pal Schone (2016). Reduction or Deflection? The Effect of
Asylum Policy on Interconnected Asylum Flows.” Migration Studies 5 (1): 65–96.
Bonjour, Saskia. 2014. “The Transfer of Pre-departure Integration Requirements for Family
Migrants Among Member States of the European Union.” Comparative Migration Studies 2
(2): 203–226.
Cangiano, Alessio. 2014. “Migration Policies and Migrant Employment Outcomes.” Conceptual
Analysis and Comparative Evidence for Europe. Comparative Migration Studies 2 (4): 417–443.
Castles, Stephen. 2004. “Why Migration Policies Fail.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27 (2): 205–227.
Cerna, Lucie. 2014. “Attracting High-Skilled Immigrants: Policies in Comparative Perspective.”
International Migration 52 (3): 69–84.
Chiswick, Barry R., and Paul W. Miller. 2004. “Language Skills and Immigrant Adjustment: What
Immigration Policy Can do!” IZA Discussion Paper n.1419.
Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. 2003. “Public Policy and the Labor Market Adjustment of New
Immigrants to Australia.” Journal of Population Economics 16 (4): 655–681.
Constant, Amelie, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. 2005. “Immigrant Performance and Selective
Immigration Policy: A European Perspective.” National Institute Economic Review 194 (1):
94–105.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2621
Czaika, Mathias, and Hein de Haas. 2016. “The Effect of Visas on Migration Processes.”
International Migration Review. Online first.
Czaika, Mathias, and Mogans Hobolth. 2016. “Do Restrictive Asylum and Visa Policies Increase
Irregular Migration Into Europe?” European Union Politics 17 (3): 345–365.
Dinesen, Peter T., and Marc Hooghe. 2010. “When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do. The
Acculturation of Generalized Trust Among Immigrants in Western Europe.” International
Migration Review 44 (3): 697–727.
Docquier, Frederic, Giovanni Peri, and Ilse Ruyssen. 2014. “The Cross-Country Determinants of
Potential and Actual Migration.” International Migration Review 48 (1): 37–99.
Doomernik, Jeroen, Rey Koslowski, Jonathan Laurence, Rahsaan Maxwell, Ines Michalowski, and
Dietrich Thränhardt. 2009. No Shortcuts: Selective Migration and Integration. Washington:
Transatlantic Academy.
Dronkers, Jaap, and Maarten Vink. 2012. “Explaining Access to Citizenship in Europe: How
Citizenship Policies Affect Naturalization Rates.” European Union Politics 13 (3): 390–412.
Dustmann, Christian. 1996. “Return Migration: the European Experience.” Economic Policy 11
(22): 213–250.
Dustmann, Christian, and Yoram Weiss. 2007. “Return Migration: Theory and Empirical Evidence
from the UK.” British Journal of Industrial Economics 45 (2): 236–256.
Ebner, Christian, and Marc Helbling. 2016. “Social Distance and Labor Market Status of
Immigrants in Switzerland. Work.” Employment and Society 30 (3): 436–454.
Ellermann, Antje. 2013. “When Can Liberal States Avoid Unwanted Immigration? Self-limited
Sovereignty and Guest Worker Recruitment in Switzerland and Germany.” World Politics 65
(3): 491–538.
FDP. 2017. Denken wir neu. Das Programm der Freien Demokraten zur Bundestagswahl 2017:
“Schauen wir Nicht Länger zu.”. Berlin: FDP-Bundesgeschäftsstelle. Accessed 14 August.2018.
https://www.fdp.de/sites/default/files/uploads/2017/08/07/20170807-wahlprogramm-wp-2017-
v16.pdf.
FitzGerald, David S., David Cook-Martin, Angela S. Garcia, and Rawan Arar. 2017. “Can you
Become one of us? A Historical Comparison of Legal Selection of ‘Assimilable’ Immigrants in
Europe and the Americas.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.
Fitzgerald, Jennifer, David Leblang, and Jessica Teets. 2014. “Defying the Law of Gravity: The
Political Economy of International Migration.” World Politics 66 (3): 406–445.
Fleischmann, Fenella, and Jaap Dronkers. 2010. “Unemployment among Immigrants in European
Labor Markets: An Analysis of Origin and Destination Effects.” Work, Employment and Society
24 (2): 337–354.
Freeman, Gary. 1994. “Can Liberal States Control Unwanted Migration?” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 534: 17–30.
Ganzeboom, Harry B. G., Paul M. de Graaf, and Donald J. Treiman. 1992. “A Standard
International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status.” Social Science Research 21: 1–56.
Goodman, Sara Wallace. 2012. “Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in
Western Europe.” World Politics 64 (4): 659–698.
Goodman, SaraWallace. 2014. Immigration andMembership Politics inWestern Europe. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Granato, Nadja, and Frank Kalter. 2001. “Die Persistenz ethnischer Ungleichheit auf
dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt.” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 53 (3):
497–520.
Guiraudon, Virginie, and Gallya Lahav. 2000. “The State Sovereignty Debate Revisited: The Case of
Migration Control.” Comparative Political Studies 33 (2): 163–195.
Hainmueller, Jens, Dominik Hangartner, and Giuseppe Pietrantuono. 2017. “Catalyst or Crown:
Does Naturalization Promote the Long-Term Social Integration of Immigrants?” American
Political Science Review 111 (2): 256–276.
Hatton, Timothy. 2004. “Seeking Asylum in Europe.” Economic Policy 38: 5–62.
Heath, Anthony, and Jean Martin. 2013. “Can Religious Affiliation Explain ‘ethnic’ Inequalities in
the Labor Market?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (6): 1005–1027.
2622 M. HELBLING ET AL.
Helbling, Marc, Liv Bjerre, Friederike Römer, and Malisa Zobel. 2017. “Measuring Immigration
Policies: The IMPIC Database.” European Political Science 16 (1): 79–98.
Helbling, Marc, and David Leblang. 2018. “Controlling Immigration? How Regulations Affect
Migration Flows.” European Journal of Political Research forthcoming.
Helbling, Marc, Tim Reeskens, Cameron Stark, Dietlind Stolle, and Matthew Wright. 2016.
“Enabling Immigrants to Participate: Redirecting our Attention to the Role of Integration
Regimes.” In Just Ordinary Citizens, edited by Antoine Bilodeau, 130–146. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Huddleston, Thomas, Özge Bilgili, and Anne-Linde Joki. 2015.Migrant Integration Policy Index
2015. Barcelona: CIDOB and MPG.
Jacobs, Dirk, and Jean Tillie. 2004. “Introduction: Social Capital and Political Integration of
Migrants.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (3): 419–427.
Koopmans, Ruud. 2010. “Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration,
Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-national Perspective.” Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies 36 (1): 1–26.
Massey, Douglas. S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward
Taylor. 1998. Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the
Millennium. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2010. “Political Participation in France among Non-European-Origin Migrants:
Segregation or Integration?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (3): 425–443.
Messina, Anthony M. 2007. The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Migali, S., and Marco Scipioni. 2018. “A Global Analysis of Intentions to Migrate.” European
Commission JRC111207.
Mood, Carina. 2010. “Logistic Regression: Why We ”cannot do what We Think We can do, and
What we can do About it.” European Sociological Review 26 (1): 67–82.
Ortega, Francesco, and Giovanni Peri. 2013. “The Effect of Income and Immigration Policies on
International Migration.” Migration Studies 1 (1): 47–74.
Paul, Anju Mary. 2011. “Stepwise International Migration: A Multistage Migration Pattern for the
Aspiring Migrant.” American Journal of Sociology 116 (6): 1842–1886.
Rinne, Ulf. 2012. The Evaluation of Immigration Policies. IZA Discussion Paper no.6369. Bonn:
Institute for the Study of Labor.
Rosenberg, Morris. 1956. “Misanthropy and Political Ideology.” American Sociological Review 21
(6): 690–695.
Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Schain, Martin. 2008. The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States. A
Comparative Study. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schmid, Samuel D., and Marc Helbling. 2016. Validating the Immigration Policies in Comparison
(IMPIC) Dataset. WZB Berlin Social Science Center. Discussion Paper. SP VI 2016–202.
Shachar, Ayelet. 2006. “The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration
Regimes.” New York University Law Review 81: 148–206.
Söhn, Janina. 2013. “Unequal Welcome and Unequal Life Chances: How the State Shapes
Integration Opportunities of Immigrants.” European Journal of Sociology/Archives Eu-
Ropéennes de Sociologie 54 (2): 295–326.
SPD. 2017. Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland. Berlin: SPD
Parteivorstand. Accessed 14 September 2018. https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/
Bundesparteitag_2017/Es_ist_Zeit_fuer_mehr_Gerechtigkeit-Unser_Regierungsprogramm.pdf.
Steinmann, Jan-Philip. 2019. “The Paradox of Integration: Why do Higher Educated New
Immigrants Perceive More Discrimination in Germany?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 45 (9): 1377–1400.
Stolle, Dietlind. 2002. “Trusting Strangers – The Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspective.”
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 31 (4): 397–412.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2623
Tani, Massimiliano. 2019. “Migration Policy and Immigrants’ Labor Market Performance.”
International Migration Review 36 (2): 1–23.
Tjaden, Jasper, Daniel Auer, and Frank Laczko. 2019. “Linking Migration Intentions with Flows:
Evidence and Potential Use (2018).” International Migration 57 (1): 36–57.
van Tubergen, F., I. Maas, and H. Flap. 2004. “The Economic Incorporation of Immigrants in 18
Western Societies: Origin, Destination, and Community Effects’.” American Sociological
Review 69 (5): 704–727.
Vernby, Kare. 2013. “Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden’s Introduction of
Noncitizen Suffrage.” American Journal of Political Science 57: 15–29.
Waldinger, Roger. 2003. “Foreigners Transformed: International Migration and the Remaking of a
Divided People.” Diaspora 12 (2): 247–272.
Zolberg, Aristide. 2003. “The Archeology of Remote Control.” In Migration Control in the North
Atlantic World, edited by A. Farhmeir, O. Faron, and P. Weil, 195–222. New York: Berghahn
Books.
2624 M. HELBLING ET AL.
